Adler: Remembering the first presidential election: The Constitution on trial

The presidential election of 1788, the first under the newly minted Constitution, was unusual and even unique in ways that 21st century Americans can scarcely imagine.

For one, there was no campaigning. In the 18th century, it was an unwritten rule that any display of ambition would be unseemly. For another, George Washington, widely viewed as the father of his country was, for all practical purposes, anointed by his fellow citizens. As it happened, he was elected unanimously by the Electoral College, a feat that he would achieve, again, in the election of 1792.

Washington’s election to the presidency was no surprise to anyone. It was a foregone conclusion, as soon as the Constitution was ratified, that Washington would be the nation’s first president. America needed its first chief executive to be a man of unimpeachable integrity, someone perceived to be above partisan politics while practicing politics, with an unvarnished reputation, who embodied the premise and promise of the American Revolution and could unite the nation while leading the embryonic republic.

Washington enjoyed the unreserved trust of his countryman, a point emphasized by Alexander Hamilton, who said the first administration – and the Constitution itself – would be on trial.

After the Constitutional Convention adjourned on Sept. 17, 1787, Hamilton made it his mission to persuade Washington to stand for election. He appealed to Washington’s sense of duty, in an exchange of letters. He warned Washington of the perils facing the nation if the first administration were headed by mediocre men unable to set the constitutional machinery in motion. The Framers of the Constitution, he explained, would be blamed for “bringing about a revolution in government without substituting anything that was worthy of the effort.”

Washington was little interested in further public service, and looked forward to retirement and peace at Mount Vernon, adding that he feared the citizenry might have expectations that he could not meet, given his lack of experience in government. But Hamilton was unrelenting and said that Washington, by signing the Constitution and promoting its ratification, had essentially promised to do everything in his power to give it life.

“It is to little purpose to have introduced a system,” he wrote, “if the weightiest influence is not given to its firm establishment, in the outset.”

Washington answered the call. There was no mystery surrounding his election, but a defect in the Electoral College, Hamilton emphasized, might prove awkward and self-defeating. The Federalists had agreed to vote for Washington for president and John Adams for vice president. However, the presidential electors under the Constitution cast two votes apiece, but did not vote separately for president and vice president. Whoever garnered the most votes became president and the runner up vice president.

The problem was obvious. A tie vote would send the election to the House of Representatives and potential mischief. Worse, the vice presidential candidate might become president.

Hamilton, an astute strategist, told James Wilson, second in importance to James Madison as an architect of the Constitution, of his plan to approach several of the electors with the request that they “waste” their votes by supporting various candidates other than Adams to prevent him from sneaking past Washington and becoming president. Hamilton’s strategy proved successful. When the 69 electors met on Feb. 4, 1789, they voted unanimously for Washington to be president and cast only 34 votes for Adams, who came in second and became vice president.

While Hamilton and the Federalists were pleased, Adams was not. The relatively weak showing was a blow to his vanity, and he wondered aloud whether this “stain” on his character should lead him to decline the office. Hamilton’s plan was designed to help Washington, not harm Adams, but the first vice president never forgave him for being unforgivably duplicitous.

Years later, Hamilton expressed surprise when he learned of Adams’s resentment toward him for what he truly believed was a sincere effort to engineer Washington’s election. Hamilton described Adams’s reaction as proof of his “extreme egotism” and vanity.

“Great was my astonishment and equally great my regret when afterwards I learned that Mr. Adams had complained of unfair treatment in not having been permitted to take an equal chance with General Washington.”

In 1788, Hamilton was unaware of Adams’s desire to be president, but in the election of 1800, Hamilton deliberately thwarted Adams’s pursuit of the presidency. We discuss that strategy next week.

David Adler, Ph.D., is a noted author who lectures nationally and internationally on the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and Presidential power. Adler’s column is supported in part through a grant from Wyoming Humanities funded by the “Why it Matters: Civic and Electoral Participation” initiative, administered by the Federation of State Humanities Councils and funded by Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Adler can be reached at david.adler@alturasinstitute.com.